We consider an economic agent with dynamic preference over a set of uncertain monetary payoffs. We assume that the agent's preferences are given by utility functions, which are updated in a time-consistent way as more information is becoming available. Our main result is that the agent's indifference prices are time-consistent if and only if his preferences can be represented with utility functions that are additive with respect to cash. We call such utility functions monetary. The proof is based on a characterization of time-consistency of dynamic utility functions in terms of indifference sets. As a special case, we obtain the result that expected utility leads to time-consistent indifference prices if and only if it is based on a linear or exponential function.
Introduction
The study of preferences and their numerical representation through utility functions goes back to Cramer and Bernoulli [9] . Axiomatic foundations and critical discussions have been given by, among others, von Neumann and Morgenstern [47] , Friedman and Savage [27] , Markowitz [42, 43, 44] , Allais [1] , Debreu [14, 15] , Savage [53] , Ellsberg [21] , Anscombe and Aumann [2] , Pratt [49] , Arrow [3] , Kahneman and Tversky [35, 55] , Gilboa and Schmeidler [30] , Yaari [58] , Maccheroni et al. [40] .
An axiomatic treatment of capital requirements started with the introduction of coherent risk measures in Artzner et al. [4, 5] ; see also Delbaen [16, 17] . Föllmer and Schied [24, 25, 26] and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin [28] introduced the more general concepts of convex and monetary risk measures. Convex and monetary risk measures for processes can be found in Cheridito et al. [11, 12] and Frittelli and Scandolo [29] .
Up to a minus sign, monetary risk measures are similar to utility functions. The main difference is that utility functions measure degrees of satisfaction, or they just serve as numerical representations of preferences, in which case their absolute values have no meaning. On the other hand, monetary risk measures are understood as capital requirements. Therefore, they are in monetary units and are additive with respect to cash. In [4, 5, 24, 25, 26] , this property is referred to as translation invariance. We here call it monetary property.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the monetary property is a sufficient and, in a certain sense, also necessary condition for a time-consistent dynamic utility function to lead to time-consistent indifference prices.
We start with an economic agent with dynamic preference in a multi-period framework. The preference is over a set of uncertain monetary payoffs paid out in the final period. At every time, the agent's preference is based on currently available information through a conditional utility function; a precise definition is given in Subsection 2.1. In Subsection 2.2, we introduce incremental utilities. They describe the agent's preferences over additional uncertain monetary payoffs when he is already in possession of one. In Subsection 2.3, we discuss certainty equivalents corresponding to incremental utility functions conditional on the information available at a certain time. Subsection 2.4 is devoted to indifference prices. An indifference bid price is the maximal amount of money that an economic agent can pay for an uncertain payoff without loosing utility. An indifference ask price is the minimal amount of money for which the agent could sell an uncertain monetary payoff without loosing utility. Indifference prices with respect to expected utility have been introduced by Hodges and Neuberger [32] ; we refer to Henderson and Hobson [31] for a survey. Upper and lower coherent previsions (see for example, Walley [57] and Maaß [39] ) can be seen as indifference prices induced by coherent risk measures. The Good deal bounds in Jaschke and Küchler [33] , Carr et al. [10] , Staum [54] can be understood as indifference prices with respect to convex monetary risk measures, or equivalently, concave monetary utility functions. Klöppel and Schweizer [36] study the dynamics of indifference prices induced by convex monetary risk measures.
In Section 3, we introduce dynamic utility functions, define time-consistency and state the paper's main result. A dynamic utility function is a sequence of conditional utility functions at different times (see Definition 3.1). Our notion of time-consistency (given in Definition 3.2) is equivalent or similar to dynamic consistency conditions that have appeared in earlier papers like, for instance, Koopmans [37] , Kreps and Porteus [38] , Epstein and Zin [23] , Duffie and Epstein [20] , Wang [56] , Epstein and Schneider [22] , Artzner et al [6] , Delbaen [18] , Riedel [50] , Peng [48] , Barrieu and El Karoui [7, 8] , Roorda et al. [51] , Cheridito et al. [13] , Detlefsen and Scandolo [19] , Jobert and Rogers [34] , Maccheroni et al. [41] . Differences are mainly due to different setups. Our main result, Theorem 3.4 shows that a time-consistent dynamic utility function induces time-consistent indifference prices if and only if it represents the same preferences as a time-consistent sequence of monetary utility functions. The proof is based on a characterization of time-consistency of dynamic utility functions in terms of indifference sets which generalizes corresponding results for monetary risk measures in Delbaen [18] and Cheridito et al. [13] . As a corollary to the main result we obtain that expected utility leads to time-consistent indifference prices if and only if it is based on a linear or exponential function, that is, only in the case of constant absolute risk aversion.
Conditional preferences
For simplicity of presentation we consider a finite sample space Ω = {ω 1 , . . . ω N }, whose elements describe all possible states of the world. Time is discrete and varies over {0, 1, . . . , T } for a finite horizon T ∈ N. The evolution of information is modelled by a filtration (F t ) T t=0 . In our setup this means that (F t ) T t=0 is a sequence of algebras of subsets of Ω generated by refining partitions
We assume that the first partition is trivial and that the partitions are strictly refining, that is, Ω = A 1 0 and for t ≤ T − 1, every time t atom A k t splits into at least two parts at time t + 1. One can think of this information structure in terms of an event tree in which every non-terminal node has at least two descendants. By L(F t ) we denote the set of all F t -measurable functions from Ω to R. A function in L(F T ) models an uncertain monetary payoff at time T . If it is in L(F t ), then its value is known by time t. We assume that there exists a cash account where money can be lent to and borrowed from at the same risk-free rate and use it as numeraire, that is, payoffs are expressed in multiples of one dollar put into the cash account at time zero. Equalities and inequalities between uncertain payoffs are understood ω-wise. For instance, X ≥ Y means that X(ω) ≥ Y (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Utility functions
Fix t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T } and consider an economic agent whose conditional preference at time
We call U t a utility function at time t if it has the following three properties:
(C) Continuity: U t is continuous with respect to the norm ||.|| ∞ given by
The economic interpretation of (LP) is that in an event A ∈ F t , the utility U t (X) of a payoff X ∈ L(F T ) only depends on the values of X taken in states of the world that have not been ruled out by A. (LP) and (SM) imply
It is natural to assume strict monotonicity (SM) if in each event A k t , the agent believes that every state ω ∈ A k t is possible. It guarantees that certainty equivalents and indifference prices are unique. (C) is a technical assumption. Together with (M), it guarantees that certainty equivalents and indifference prices exist.
We call a utility function U t at time t monetary if it satisfies the (MP) Monetary property:
If an agent with monetary utility function at time t prefers X to Y , then he also prefers X + m to Y + m for any m ∈ L(F t ). The monetary property was introduced in Artzner et al. [4, 5] in the context of risk measurement; see also Delbean [16, 17] , Föllmer and Schied [24, 25, 26] and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin [28] . For conditional and dynamic monetary risk measures, we refer to Cheridito et al. [13] and the references therein.
Other properties that will play a role in this paper are:
(LC) Local concavity:
We call a utility function at time t loss sensitive if it satisfies (LS), quasi-concave if it fulfills (LQC), and concave if it has the property (LC). The condition (LS) is needed in the proof of our main result, Theorem 3.4, below. An agent with a quasi-concave utility function U t at time t never prefers X to λX
and λ ∈ L(F t ) such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. This means that the agent is uncertainty avers, or diversification does not reduce the agent's utility. (LC) obviously is stronger than (LQC).
On the other hand, (MP) and (LQC) imply (LC). Indeed, if a function
Also, note that every concave utility function U t at time t is loss sensitive. To see this, fix X ∈ L(F T ) and an F t -atom A k t . Denote the value of U t (X) on A k t by U t,k (X). Then, by (SM) and (LC), m → U t,k (X + m1 {ω} ) is a strictly increasing, concave function from R to R, and therefore, lim m→−∞ U t,k (X + m1 {ω} ) = −∞. In particular, U t is loss sensitive. A probability measure Q on Ω is given by the weights q 1 , . . . , q N it assigns to the states ω 1 , . . . , ω N . We call Q strictly positive if q 1 , . . . , q N > 0.
Examples 2.1
Assume U t is of the form
for a non-empty set Q of strictly positive probability measures on Ω, a mapping c from Q to L(F t ) and a strictly increasing, continuous function u from R to R. It can easily be checked that U t is a mapping from L(F T ) to L(F t ) with the properties (LP), (SM) and (C). If lim x→−∞ u(x) = −∞, then U t is loss sensitive (LS). If u is concave, then U t satisfies the local concavity property (LC). Preference functionals of the form (2.1) are studied in Maccheroni et al. [40, 41] in an Anscombe-Aumann type framework. For c ≡ 0, (2.1) reduces to a multi-prior conditional expectation
see Gilboa and Schmeidler [30] for a axiomatization in an unconditional Anscombe-Auman framework and Epstein and Schneider [22] for the conditional and dynamic case, In the special case where Q consists of only one element Q and
For u(x) = x, the utility function U t of (2.1) has the monetary property (MP), and −U t is a convex monetary risk measure; see Föllmer and Schied [24, 25, 26] for the unconditional case and Cheridito et al. [13] or Detlefsen and Scandolo [19] for the conditional and dynamic case. If u(x) = x and c ≡ 0, then −U t is a coherent risk measure. We refer to Artzner et al. [4, 5] , Delbaen [16, 17] for the unconditional case and to Artzner et al. [6] , Delbaen [18] , Riedel [50] , Roorda et al. [51] for conditional and dynamic coherent risk measures.
We point out that in our framework the interpretation of functionals of the form (2.1) is more flexible than in Gilboa and Schmeidler [30] , Epstein and Schneider [22] or Maccheroni et al. [40, 41] . To discuss this point in more detail, let us for a moment consider the unconditional case t = 0. Then (2.1) becomes
for a function c from Q to R. [30, 22, 40, 41] work in the Anscombe-Aumann framework, the function u is affine and up to trivial transformations, a preference order has at most one representation of the form (2.3). It can be understood to describe preferences in situations where the probabilities of the states of Ω are not known or do not exist. Elements of Q can be interpreted as prior models describing possible probabilities of future scenarios. u describes the agent's risk attitude in situations where the probabilities are known. By taking the minimum over all models of Q, the agent takes a worst case approach. But the term c(Q) allows for discrimination of models in Q according to their plausibility. For instance, the agent could include unlikely models Q in Q as stress tests. A small degree of plausibility corresponds to a high value of c(Q) and a small impact in (2.3). The agent's attitude towards uncertainty can be seen as a combination of risk attitude and ambiguity attitude, where the risk attitude is described by the function u and the ambiguity attitude by (Q, c).
In contrast to this, a preference order in our setup can have different representations of the form (2.3). If, for instance, P is a fixed strictly positive probability measure, Q contains all strictly positive probability measures and the function c : Q → R is given by c(Q) = 
Formula (2.4) is well known. For the convenience of the reader, we provide a short proof: For fixed X ∈ L(F T ), define the strictly positive probability measure P X on Ω by
.
Since relative entropy is always non-negative, we get for every strictly positive probability measure Q on Ω,
where equality is attained if Q = P X . This shows (2.4), and thereby, that the utility function min Q∈Q {E Q [X] + c(Q)} induces exactly the same preference structure on L(F T ) as the expected exponential utility E P −e −γX . ♦
Incremental utility functions
If at time t, our agent is already holding a portfolio leading to a time
We call V the agent's endowment and define
Definition 2.2 The incremental utility with respect to a utility function U t at time t and endowment V ∈ L(F T ) is given by
It is clear that if U t has any of the properties (LP), (SM), (C), (M), (MP), (LS), (LQC), (LC), then so does U V t . Moreover, U V t (0) = 0, and U 0 t induces the same conditional preference order on L(F T ) as U t . It is also worth mentioning that if U t is monetary at time t, then U
. This means that provided U t satisfies (MP), our agent's conditional preference at time t is invariant under a change ∆V ∈ L(F t ) in endowment V . This provides a first hint of a relation between the monetary property and dynamic consistency properties.
Certainty equivalents
Existence of C V t (X) follows because U V t has the properties (M) and (C), uniqueness because U V t satisfies (SM).
Proposition 2.4 For every utility function U t at time t and V ∈ L(F T ), the corresponding certainty equivalent C V t has the following properties:
Proof. (1)- (5) are obvious. (6) can be derived from (2) and the definition of U V t as follows:
and λ ∈ (0, 1),
Since C V t has the continuity property (C), we can let λ tend towards 1 to conclude (8) is proved.
Properties (1) and (2) show that C V t is a utility function at time t that induces the same conditional preference order on L(F T ) as U V t . Since C V t (0) = 0, it follows from (LP) that
Properties (6) and (7) will be needed in the proof of the main result, Theorem 3.4, below.
Indifference prices
It is unique because U V t is strictly monotone (SM). By definition of U V t , we have
Thus, b V t (X) is the maximal price that an agent with utility function U t and endowment V can pay for the payoff X at time t without loosing utility. The corresponding ask price is given by a V t (X) = −b V t (−X). It satisfies the equation
It is the minimal price for which the agent can sell the payoff X at time t without loosing utility.
Proposition 2.6 Let b V t be the indifference indifference price and C V t the certainty equivalent with respect to a utility function U t at time t and endowment V ∈ L(F T ). Then b V t
has the following properties:
Proof. (1), (2), (4) and (5) are straightforward. To show (3), assume that U t fulfills (LQC). Then,
, and therefore,
Property (1) shows that b V t is a monetary utility function at time t. (3)
shows that indifference bid prices of an uncertainty averse agent are concave and dominated by the indifference ask prices. (4)-(6) relate indifference prices to certainty equivalents. The economic interpretation is straightforward. Again, the local property (LP) for b V t takes the particular form
Indifference prices with respect to expected utility were introduced by Hodges and Neuberger [32] . For more related literature, we refer to Henderson and Hobson [31] and the references therein. Klöppel and Schweizer (2005) study the dynamics of indifference prices induced by monetary utility functions. In these papers, there exists a financial market and agents maximize utilities by investing in it. Since we want to focus on the dynamics of preferences, we do not include a financial market here.
3 Time-consistency Definition 3.1 A dynamic utility function is a family (U t ) T t=0 of utility functions U t at times t = 0, . . . , T .
Definition 3.2 We call a dynamic utility function (U t ) T t=0 time-consistent if for all X, Y ∈ L(F T ) and t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
This means that at time t, in the event A k t , the agent prefers Y to X while he knows that at time t + 1, he will weakly prefer X to Y in every state of the world. This clearly leads to inconsistencies over time.
Dynamic consistency conditions equal or similar to (3.1) have been studied in different contexts; see for instance, Koopmans [37] [7, 8] , Cheridito et al. [13] , Detlefsen and Scandolo [19] , Jobert and Rogers [34] , [41] .
The following lemma gives equivalent conditions for time-consistency of a dynamic utility function.
Lemma 3.3 Let (U t ) T t=0 be a dynamic utility function with certainty equivalents C
. Then the following are equivalent:
. This is equivalent to
X). This shows (2) ⇒ (4). If (4) holds and U
is a special case of (2) ⇔ (4), and the proof is complete.
The following theorem is our main result. It shows that a time-consistent dynamic utility function leads to time-consistent indifference prices if and only if the corresponding certainty equivalents have the monetary property (MP). The proof is given in the Appendix. 
is time-consistent. But again, the corresponding certainty equivalents C V 0 = C V 1 do not need to have the monetary property.
Examples 3.6
Dynamic monetary utility functions
Let (U t ) T t=0 be a time-consistent sequence of monetary utility functions. Then, U 0 t is monetary for all t = 0, . . . , T , and it follows form (5) of Proposition 2.4 that U 0 t = C 0 t . Hence, by Theorem 3.4.1, (U t ) T t=0 induces time-consistent indifference prices. It is shown in Föllmer and Schied [24] that every concave function U : L(F T ) → R with the properties (M) and (MP) has a representation of the form
for a non-empty set of probability measures Q on Ω and a function c : Q → R.
If (U t ) T t=0 is a dynamic utility function such that all U t are monetary and concave, then it follows from Theorem 3.23 in Cheridito et al. [13] that it can be represented as
for non-empty subsets Q t of strictly positive probability measures on Ω and a sequence of functions c t from Q t to L(F t ). Necessary and sufficient conditions for time-consistency in terms of the sequence (Q t , c t ) T t=0 are given in Cheridito et al. [13] and Detlefsen and Scandolo [19] ; see also Maccheroni et al. [41] .
A specific example of a time-consistent dynamic monetary utility function is the dynamic entropic utility function
for a constant γ > 0. It can easily be checked that for all t, U t is a monetary utility function at time t and (U t ) T t=0 is time-consistent. It has appeared in different contexts; see for instance, Rouge and El Karoui [52] , Zariphopoulou [45, 46] , Barrieu and El Karoui [7, 8] , Detlefsen and Scandolo [19] . A generalized version of (3.2) is discussed in Example 5.6 of Cheridito et al. [13] .
Dynamic expected utility
Let Q be a fixed strictly positive probability measure on Ω and u a strictly increasing, continuous function from R to R. Define
It is immediate from the tower property of the conditional expectation that (U t ) T t=0 is timeconsistent. If lim x→−∞ u(x) = −∞, then all U t are loss sensitive. Hence, it follows from Theorem 3.4 that the indifference bid prices (b V t ) T t=0 induced by (U t ) T t=0 are time-consistent for all V ∈ L(F T ) if and only if the certainty equivalents
have the monetary property (MP). This is exactly the case when u has constant absolute risk aversion, that is, either
where the last case is ruled out by the condition lim x→∞ u(x) = −∞.
Dynamic multi-prior expected utility
Let (U t ) T t=0 be a dynamic utility function given by
for a non-empty closed convex set Q of strictly positive probability measures and a strictly increasing, concave function u from R to R. Necessary and sufficient conditions on the set Q for (U t ) T t=0 to be time-consistent have been studied in Epstein and Schneider [22] , Artzner et al. [6] , Delbaen [18] , Riedel [50] , Roorda et al. [51] . Let us assume that these conditions are satisfied and lim x→−∞ u(x) = −∞. Then (U t ) T t=0 is a time-consistent sequence of loss sensitive utility functions. By Theorem 3.4, the corresponding indifference prices are time-consistent if and only if the certainty equivalents In the whole appendix, (U t ) T t=0 is a dynamic utility function. C V t and b V t denote the certainty equivalent and indifference bid price corresponding to U t and endowment V ∈ L(F T ).
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. Let V ∈ L(F T ). It follows from the time-consistency of (U t ) T t=0 and Lemma 3.3 that (C V t ) T t=0 is time-consistent. By (7) of Proposition 2.4, C V t is monetary for all t = 1, . . . , T . Hence, it follows from (5) of Proposition 2.6 that
which shows (A.1) and concludes the proof.
Our proof of Theorem 3.4.2 is based on a characterization of time-consistency of dynamic utility functions in terms of indifference sets. This extends results on the decomposition property of acceptance sets of monetary risk measures in Delbaen [18] and Cheridito et al. [13] . For 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T and V ∈ L(F T ), we introduce the indifference set
It follows from the definitions of U V s and C 0
Thus, I V s,t consists of all monetary payoffs X ∈ L(F t ) that leave an agent with endowment V indifferent at time s. Also, it is clear that
The local property (LP) of U V s translates into the following property for I V s,t : (LP') Local property: 1 A X ∈ I V s,t for all X ∈ I V s,t and A ∈ F s .
The following are equivalent:
it follows from (6) of Proposition 2.4 that
Then, (2) implies
, we choose X ∈ I V s,T and decompose it into
Moreover, by (6) of Proposition 2.4, it follows from
By (6) of Proposition 2.4, it follows from
and therefore,
, which shows that
and therefore, by (6) of Proposition 2.4,
Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. For fixed V ∈ L(F T ) and r = s, t,Ũ r := b V r is a utility function at time r that equals its own certainty equivalent. Therefore, the equivalence of (1) and (2) follows directly from the equivalence of (1) and (3) in Lemma 3.3. Furthermore, we havẽ
and since b V r is monetary,
It follows from the equivalence of (1) and (3) in Theorem A.1 that (2) is equivalent tõ 
By (A.3), this reduces toĨ
0 s,T =Ĩ 0 s,t +Ĩ 0 t,T , which by (A.2), is equivalent to (3). Corollary A.3 Assume that (U t ) T t=0 and (b V t ) T t=0 are time-consistent for all V ∈ L(F T ). Then I V t,T = I V +Y t,T for all V ∈ L(F T ), t = 1, . .
. , T, and Y ∈ I
V t−1,t . Proof. Fix V ∈ L(F T ) and Y ∈ I V t−1,t . i) We first show I V +Y t,T ⊂ I V t,
